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THE RIGHTS OF A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE IN NEBRASKA
I. INTRODUCTION
It has long been accepted that public employees are to be
treated differently from employees in private enterprise. This
proposition is primarily based on traditional sovereignty concepts.
Another basis of the distinction is the absence of an ordinary
business profit motive of the governmental employer. Also, some
consider that the governmental employer is in a position to protect
or safeguard the best interests of the public as a whole, including
the employees, whereas the private entrepreneur is interested only
in protecting the interests of his investment or the investment of
his stockholders. Although these distinctions have some validity,
changing conditions are weakening their effect and application.
The role of the government in American enterprise is con-
stantly increasing; today the government conducts and controls
many functions that have traditionally been within the purview
of private enterprise. At the present time almost one-sixth of the
nonagricultural working population of this country is employed
by the government.'
Most governments at all levels actively encourage and sup-
port collective bargaining in private enterprise as an instrumen-
tality to promote industrial peace; however, when considering
the status of their own employees, they may tend to take a dif-
ferent view.2 Nebraska provides, for example, that "Employees
shall have the right of self-organization and the right to form, join
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in lawful, concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection; and such employees shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities. ' '3 But this does not apply
to employees of the state or political subdivision.4
1 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor, 12 Employment and
Earnings 13, 20 (1965).
2 "Government as employer has failed in many instances to practice what
it compels industry to do. Legislatures which deny to government
agencies the use of some proper form of 'collective bargaining' proce-
dures so familar in industry (at least in terms of 'collective nego-
tiation'), which attempt to restrict unduly the right of employees to
organize and to petition the government for redress of their grievances,
need to review the problem more realistically." ABA LABOR RELATIONS
SECTION (1955).
3 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-904 (Reissue 1960).
4 NE. REv. STAT. § 48-902(3) (Reissue 1960).
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In Local 507, IBEW v. Hastings,5 the Nebraska Supreme Court
has followed the majority rule in declaring that governmental
employees do not have collective bargaining rights in the same
sense that their counterparts in private enterprise have. The leg-
islative aftermath of this decision became one of the most con-
tested issues of the 1967 unicameral session. The specific rights
governmental employees and employee organizations possess after
the Hastings decision and the new legislation, as well as the gen-
erally expanding role of government in our society, compel a
reexamination of the status of the governmental employee.
II. THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
It is not questioned that public employees have some rights
to associate and present their views and demands to their em-
ployer. These rights arise primarily under the first amendment of
the United States Constitution and comparable provisions in the
Constitution of the State of Nebraska. 6
However, employment by the government is a privilege, not a
right, and those who accept it must do so subject to the conditions
involved. This maxim, though, is not to be extended to the point
that a person is denied his constitutional right to organize because
he chooses to be employed by the government. 7 The leading case
of Springfield v. Clouse8 recognizes that these employees have a
constitutional right to organize, but holds that they do not have
collective bargaining rights in the same sense as individuals in
private employment. The opinion refuses to distinguish between
persons employed by the government in its governmental capacity
and those employed by the government acting in a proprietary
capacity.9 The court says, "all citizens have the right, preserved
r 179 Neb. 455, 138 N.W.2d 822 (1965).
6 "The right of the people peaceably to assemble to consult for the com-
mon good, and to petition the government, or any department thereof,
shall never be abridged." NEB. CoNsT. art. 1, § 19.
7 But see, Perez v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 78 Cal. App.2d 638, 178 P.2d
537 (1947), which upheld a board ruling that members of the Los
Angeles police department could not associate with any trade asso-
ciation or labor union which admitted to membership persons who are
not employees of the City of Los Angeles. The court said: "The action
of the Board of Police Commissioners raises no constitutional ques-
tions .... The attempt to raise the issue of free speech and free as-
sembly in the within action is unavailing." Id. at 649, 178 P.2d at 544.
8 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947).
9 Thus far the courts have been unsuccessful in attempts to explicitly
define the governmental-proprietary distinction of government activi-
ties. Generally a government is said to be acting in a "governmental"
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by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and
* . . The 1945 Missouri Constitution ... to peaceably assemble and
organize for any proper purpose, to speak freely and to present
their views and desires to any public official or legislative body."'1
Although some right to organize is well established, it is far
from an answer to the problems of public employees. Without
means of exerting economic or other pressure to back up the group's
position, such as the strike, picket or a system of governmental
supervision, such as a fact finding procedure, the mere organiza-
tion of a group of employees provides little benefit for these em-
ployees. If the governmental employer is not reasonable in listen-
ing to the requests or the grievances of the individual employee,
the mere fact that a group of these employees join together to
present the grievances will not substantially alter the employer's
attitude. Various methods have been used to place effective power
behind the right to organize including association with an outside
labor union, striking, picketing and various procedures for judicial
intervention into disputes. Not all of these, however, are equally
available to organizations of public employees.
A. TnE STnR
The strike is the most formidable weapon that employees can
utilize to enforce their requests of the employer. The threat of a
work stoppage by an organization representing all or a substantial
part of the employees of a firm backs up their right to organize
and enables them to effectively present their requests to their
employer so that he will listen. In private enterprise the strike
serves the employees as a means of balancing power between them-
selves and their employers; but public employees are in a different
position. In many areas of public employment a strike is intoler-
able. The employees cannot enforce their requests by striking
without seriously endangering the public welfare. A frequently
cited authority for the proposition that governmental employees
do not have a right to strike is a famous letter written by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt to the President of the National Federation
of Federal Employees." In this letter, President Roosevelt said:
capacity when it is performing activities that only the government
could perform and that it is essential for the government to perform.
A government is said to be acting in its "proprietary" capacity when
it performs activities traditionally within the purview of private enter-
prise or that could (or are) being performed by private enterprise.
The distinction is used in many areas, primarily tort liability and taxa-
tion, but is seldom used in the area of labor relations.
10 Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 1244, 206 S.W.2d 539, 542 (1947).
11 Letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Mr. Luther C. Steward,
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Since their [federal employees] own services have to do with the
functioning of the Government, a strike of public employees man-
ifests nothing less than an intent on their part to prevent or
obstruct the operations of Government until their demands are
satisfied. Such action, looking toward paralysis of Government by
those who have sworn to support it, is unthinkable and intolerable.
This letter was written in reference to employees of the federal
government, but it is often used to support the proposition that
the employees of any government or governmental subdivision, re-
gardless of their duties or their positions, are not allowed to strike.
It is uniformly considered as one of the rights or privileges that a
person surrenders when he accepts employment from the govern-
ment.
In Nebraska, as in most states, all persons are specifically pro-
hibited by statute12 from hindering governmental service by en-
gaging in a strike. To engage in or encourage a strike against the
government is punishable by fine and/or imprisonment. In addi-
tion a Nebraska statute 8 makes any attempt to impose the effects
of a strike on a governmental employer by means of a "concerted
quit" illegal.
The propriety of prohibiting strikes by governmental employ-
ees is not within the purview of this article. The important point
is that the strongest sanction of the private enterprise employee is
generally not available to the governmental employee. In order for
the governmental employee to adequately protect his interests
some substitute must be made available to him.
B. THE PiCKET
A right to picket for the purpose of publicity, like the right to
organize, is a constitutionally protected right of every individual. 4
Under the doctrine stated in Thornhill v. Alabama, an individual's
right to picket for any "legal purpose" is protected as an expres-
sion of free speech. In its normal use picketing is a supplement to
a strike. By use of the picket line the employees publicize their
discontent to the public in an attempt to gain the public support
necessary to exert pressure on the employer to submit to their
demands.
In most cases the governmental officials that the employees
August 16, 1937, in C. EYN, LABOR UmONS AND MUmCIPAL E1APLOYE
LAw 436 (1946).
12 NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-821 (Reissue 1960).
is NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-822 (Reissue 1960).
14 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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are trying to persuade are either elected or subordinate to an
elected official. These officials are extremely sensitive to public
opinion. If the employees do in fact have a legitimate grievance,
the picket could be utilized as a weapon to force the employer to
hear their story. If he fails to do so and the grievance is in fact
legitimate, the picket may be able to arouse public opinion on the
side of the employees to the point where the employer is forced by
public pressure to be reasonable in his treatment of the employees.
The use of the picket in this manner would not alienate the public
from their elected officials. The public officials are in a position to
effectively explain their position to the public so that both sides of
the controversy can be considered. The primary function of the
picket is to bring the dispute to the attention of the public.
The use of the picket as a means to enforce demands is not
comparable to the strike. It does not interrupt the efficient work-
ing of government, nor can it be interpreted as a challenge to the
sovereignty of the government. The picket does, however, exert a
political influence on the vote-minded officials comparable to the
economic influence the strike exerts on the profit-minded private
entrepreneur.
The picket has seldom been used as an entity separate and
distinct from the strike. When public employees do attempt to
picket, their actions are usually interpreted by the courts as an
attempt to force their employer into a collective bargaining con-
tract. In most jurisdictions the courts hold that governmental em-
ployers do not have the authority to enter into collective bargaining
agreements in the absence of specific statutory authority. 5 Thus
where the specific statutory authority is not available, the picket is
considered to be promoting an "illegal purpose" and therefore is not
regarded as a constitutionally protected exercise of freedom of
speech. If picketing is utilized not as an attempt to force the em-
ployer into a collective bargaining agreement for which the em-
ployer has no statutory authority, but rather as merely an attempt
to present their grievances to the employer and to legally influence
the discretionary decisions of the employer, then the picketing
should no longer be considered illegal. It seems reasonable that the
use of the picket could profitably be utilized by public employees
to persuade the employer to respond more favorably to their
requests.
C. AFFIIATiON Wrm ORGANIZED LABOR
It is one thing to say that the public employees have the right
15 Local 507, IBEW v. Hastings, 179 Neb. 455, 138 N.W.2d 822 (1965).
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to organize, but a more crucial question arises concerning their
association with an outside organization, i.e., a labor union. It is
often contended on behalf of the governmental employer that it is
against public policy and not in the best interests of good govern-
ment for their employees to associate with a labor organization.
For example, in the controversy that gave rise to the Hastings
case, the Hastings Board of Public Works refused to recognize the
IBEW as a spokesman for those employees who had authorized
the union to act for them, yet it indicated a willingness to discuss
demands of the employees presented individually or through su-
perintendents, supervisors, or foremen.' 6
The exertion of outside influence is alleged to be harmful to
the government and likely to detract from the smooth operation of
government. It has been said that "unionization of the public serv-
ice diverts the loyalty, allegiance and obligations of the employees
from the people and their government which are entitled to them,
to the union .... Such an intolerable situation is utterly incom-
patible with sound and orderly government. It constitutes a
threat to state sovereignty."' 7 Under this view it is assumed that
because of the absence of the profit motive in the governmental
service, the public employer will always protect the best interests
of their employees. This is in fact a valid proposition as far as it
goes, but this proposition alone cannot support a contention that
public employees should not unionize. This is not a question of
striking or forcing collective bargaining activities of a union; it is
simply a question of whether the public employees can become
associated with outside labor unions.
A group of employees, just like an individual employee, may
be inhibited from approaching the employer and effectively pre-
senting a valid grievance and for good reason. When the govern-
ment is the employer it retains complete discretion over the work-
ing conditions of its employees. If the employer refuses to be rea-
sonable there may be no remedy for the employees. It is true that
with widespread civil service laws and similar legislation, the em-
ployer cannot summarily dismiss an employee or a group of em-
ployees for attempting to present a grievance; but civil service
laws are not concerned with the day to day operations of govern-
ment. An employee trying to present a grievance to the super-
visor he has to work under every day (or even his supervisor's
16 Local 507, IBEW v. Hastings, Court of Industrial Relations of the State
of Nebraska No. 17 (filed May 5, 1967).
17 Weisenfeld, Public Employees-First or Second Class Citizens, 16 Lab.
L.J. 685, 687 (1965) citing a speech by Gov. William M. Tuck to the
Virginia Legislature.
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superior) is in a precarious position.
Governmental service is not immune from employee grievances
and discontent. Generally the cause of this discontent is a failure
of communication between management and the employees; and it
is this same failure of communication that inhibits a satisfactory
solution to the problems. An employee representative could often
provide the essential communication between management and its
employees as well as valuable experience and expertise in the area
of labor relations.
For example a job transfer within a department or agency
may be virtually impossible. A supervisor that is satisfied with
the status quo may suppress information on job openings that cer-
tain of his employees are qualified for and the employee will not
freely inquire about a different job. Where this situation exists
the employee representative could establish a system where all
qualified employees would be notified of job openings or the rep-
resentative would inquire about openings on behalf of interested
employees. Possibly an employee feels he wasn't given sufficient
notice for an out of town assignment; or he feels he draws more
than his share of undesirable assignments; or he continually has to
work with equipment or helpers inferior to that of his co-workers;
or more than one superior is giving him inconsistent instructions.
The list is infinite, but these are all everyday problems that an
employee representative could present to the employer more ef-
fectively than could the employee himself. This added link of com-
munication would increase employee morale and likely result
in more efficient management. Repeated valid grievances could
induce better planning which would mean more notice before an
out of town assignment, fairer distribution of assignments and more
objective promotions. The presentation of a grievance by an out-
side representative is entirely unlike one presented by an employee
who must go back to work the next day.1s
Just as the right to organize is constitutionally protected, it
would seem that the first amendment right of association 19 would
18 "Grievance machinery should not be designed to deal with disciplinary
cases, nor with salary or other problems specially regulated by statute.
They should be confined to areas wherein management has authority
to exercise its responsibility and discretion to adjust or correct situa-
tions which may be the cause of just grievances. Even where a griev-
ance may appear to be fancied rather than real a sympathetic attitude
on the part of supervisors and management could go a long way to
relieve misapprehension and bolster morale by enhancing confidence
in management's desire to treat employees fairly." ABA LABOR RELA-
TIONS SECTION 95 (1955).
19 "It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the
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give the employees the right to choose their own representative to
present their grievances, whether it be one of their own ranks or
an outside representative. The right of association is a limited
right,20 and it is sometimes contended that the limitations should
include a prohibition of governmental employees associating with
labor unions. Under the view that association with organized la-
bor is antagonistic to the duties entrusted to public employees, it
is contended that the overriding public welfare justifies limiting
the employee's right of association. Thus the right of public em-
ployees to affiliate with an outside organization may be restricted
or abrogated in situations in which a conflict of loyalties might af-
fect the performance of the employees' duties.
21
This limitation of the basic right may be warranted in certain
situations, but it is not valid as a blanket prohibition of all affilia-
tion of public employees with outside organizations. A limitation
of a right so basic as the right of association should be carried no
farther than is absolutely necessary. The American Civil Liber-
ties Union describes the right of government employees to associate
with a labor organization as a basic civil liberty.22 In their words,
"when a vital civil liberty is concerned, the surrender of the right
can be justified only when there is a showing of a positive rather
than a remotely speculative danger to the public health and
safety. '23
There has been very little litigation on the issue. The leading
case, Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ.,24 held that public
employees, in the absence of statute to the contrary, could organize
as a labor union. The court said, "in the absence of prohibitory stat-
ute or regulation, no good reason appears why public employees
should not organize as a labor union. '25 In this case the labor union
involved was a local, independent organization; thus, the important
question of affiliation with an outside organization was not pre-
sented. The Norwalk case relies on the case of Springfield, v.
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'lib-
erty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which embraces freedom of speech." NAACP v. Alabama 357 U.S.
449, 460 (1958).
20 Cf. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
21 See Perez v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 78 Cal. App.2d 638, 178 P.2d 537
(1947).
22 Policy Statement on Civil Rights in Government Employment by the
American Civil Liberties Union, April 13, 1959.
23 Id. at 1.
24 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951).
25 Id. at 276,,83 A.2d at 485.
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Clouse26 which simply says, "we start with the proposition that
there is nothing improper in the organization of municipal employ-
ees into labor unions; and that no new constitutional provisions
were necessary to authorize them. ' 27 The Clouse case does not say
whether the union involved was an independent organization or
one connected with an outside organization, but apparently it does
not distinguish between them. The real issues in this area have not
as yet been presented to the courts.
D. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LEGISLATION
Employees of governmental agencies and subdivisions have ar-
gued intensively that they have a right to bargain collectively with
their employer. These demands have been met by the broad, sim-
ple answer that the governmental employer does not have the
power to bargain with the employees in the absence of specific
statutory authority, and by a number of corollary arguments.28
26 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947).
27 Id. at 1244, 206 S.W.2d at 542.
28 The government employer argues that any negotiations or contract-
ing with a representative of the employees is an unlawful delegation of
authority. The duties of the officers of the government are explicitly
defined by law and one of these duties is the control of the employees
of the government. To negotiate with an outside representative con-
cerning conditions of employment would be an unlawful delegation of
this legally prescribed authority.
The labor unions and employees contend that they are not trying
to relieve these officials of their duties, but that they only want to
negotiate with the officials in good faith concerning the conditions of
their employment; and that negotiations alone do not constitute any
delegation of authority. There is no requirement that the employer
enter into an agreement with the employees representative but if an
agreement is reached, it is not a delegation of authority. The em-
ployees cannot force the employer to agree to anything that he does
not want to.
The government employer contends that it is against public policy
for him to negotiate with the representative of the employees for the
employer must have absolute authority over the employees at all times.
In the interests of good government the employer must be able to
change conditions of employment to meet any unseen contingency. To
this argument the employees contend that the public policy is to treat
all employees alike. The government requires private industry to rec-
ognize all the employees' rights and logically should not be permitted
to refuse to recognize them either.
Governmental employers argue that they only have the powers
expressly given them by the state legislatures, and that in the absence
of express statutory authority they do not have the power to bargain
collectively with the employees. The employees counter that govern-
mental agencies have, in addition to the express powers given by the
legislature, the implied power to implement these responsibilities in the
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With few exceptions 29 the courts have held that in the absence of
this specific statutory authority the governmental agencies and sub-
divisions do not have the power to enter into collective bargaining
with their employees in the same sense as employees in private
enterprise.30 These cases are generally based on the proposition
that the governmental employers derive all their power and author-
ity from the state legislature and do not have an inherent or im-
plied power to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with
their employees. With few exceptions 31 these cases leave undecided
what power the employer has to negotiate with the employees
without actually entering into a binding agreement. In many in-
best manner available. The power to bargain collectively should be
implied from the right to employ personnel and the power to contract.
They argue that the employees have an inherent right to be recognized
as a collective unit for purposes of bargaining with their employer, and
the employer has an implied power to bargain with them.
The employer contends that the difference in purposes and goals
between a public and a private employer means that the employees
should be treated differently. The absence of the profit motive in gov-
ernment means that the employer will look out for the best interests
of the employees as well as the best interests of the public. The em-
ployees answer that the growing intervention of government into
activities traditionally private has weakened this distinction. The gov-
ernment is often now in direct competition with private enterprise and
there is no reason why the employees of the two should be treated any
differently.
The government also contends that collective bargaining in theory
and in practice conflicts with existing civil service laws. The em-
ployees contend that collective bargaining and civil service laws can
be used co-extensively; collective bargaining is intended to supplement
civil service laws, not replace them.
Government employers argue that collective bargaining in its very
essence contemplates the strike as a weapon to enforce the demands of
the employees, that the strike is inconsistent with the position of pub-
lic employees, and the whole process of collective bargaining is mean-
ingless without the strike. The employees answer that a strike is not
essential to collective bargaining. The public employee can use polit-
ical pressure through picketing and lobbying as a substitute to striking.
Usually public employees do not advocate that they should have a
right to strike, but that collective bargaining can serve a useful pur-
pose even without a strike.
29 See Local 266, IBEW v. Salt River Project Agr. Imp. & P. Dist., 78
Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954); Local 611, IBEW v. Farmington, 75 N.M.
393, 405 P.2d 233 (1965).
30 Nutter v. Santa Monica, 74 Cal.2d 292, 168 P.2d 741 (1946); Norwalk
Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951);
Mugford v. Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1945); Springfield v.
Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947); Local 507, IBEW v. Hast-
ings, 179 Neb. 455, 138 N.W.2d 822 (1965).
31 See Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d
482 (1951).
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stances the holdings are interpreted as denying the employer any
authority even to discuss or negotiate with a representative of
the employees.
These holdings, coupled with increased pressures by employ-
ees and labor unions to obtain collective bargaining rights, have
induced legislative action in many states. In recent years, many
states3 2 have enacted legislation giving governmental agencies and
subdivisions specific statutory authority to bargain collectively with
their employees. These statutes give employees the right to organ-
ize, the right to affiliate with labor organizations of their own
choosing, and the right to bargain collectively with their employer.
Under the typical statute, the governmental employer is not
only empowered to enter into a collective bargaining agreement
with his employees, he is commanded by law to enter into such
negotiations and to bargain in good faith. When an agreement is
reached, if there is one, the employer is given the statutory au-
thority to enter into a binding collective bargaining agreement
with the employees. There is no statutory proclamation that the
parties must reach an agreement.
In governmental service the balance of power that is so inherent
in the collective bargaining process is missing. The public employ-
ees are almost universally denied the right to strike and it is obvi-
ous that the governmental employer could not impose a lock-out.
The statutes provide for intervention of a governmental agency,
upon the petition of either party, to insure that both parties will
comply with the statutory command to bargain in good faith.
Fact finding is currently the procedure most commonly utilized
by the statutes pertaining to solution of disputes involving public
employment. Fact finding has been described as "a device for
securing proposed terms of settlement which will secure wide pub-
lic backing and require the parties to give careful, serious atten-
tion to them.' '3 3 A typical example is the Massachusetts statute.34
This statute provides that neither party may refuse to bargain in
good faith. When it is alleged that one party is refusing to bargain
in good faith, the state labor commission is directed to order fact
32 See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-467 to 7-477 (Supp. 1965); MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 178 (Supp. 1965); lMicH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(9)
(Supp. 1965); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.52 (1966); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 31:3 (Supp. 1965); ORE. REV. STAT. § 243.710 to 243.760 (1965); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 36-11-1 (Supp. 1965); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70
(Supp. 1965).
33 A. CHAMBERLAIN & J. KumH, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 415 (1965).
34 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 178L (Supp. 1965).
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finding. If it is determined that a prohibited practice has been
committed, the commission is empowered to issue an order to the
guilty party to cease and desist from the prohibited acts, and the
commission "shall take further affirmative action as will comply
with the provisions of this section.
'35
The fact finder also attempts to resolve the dispute. Due to the
inequality of the parties' power, the performance of this function
is more crucial in public employment than in private industry.
If the efforts of the fact finder are not successful in resolving
the dispute and the parties are still deadlocked the employees are
still without a remedy. Despite this shortcoming the fact finding
process can be a valuable instrument in public employment col-
lective bargaining. It insures that both parties will bargain in
good faith and it can resolve many actual disputes.
III. THE NEBRASKA SITUATION
In the 1943 session of the Nebraska Legislature, a bill was
introduced to give all governmental employers in Nebraska express
statutory authority and power to bargain collectively with an ex-
clusive bargaining representative chosen by a majority of the em-
ployees to represent them.8 6 The bill was introduced to give pub-
lic employees collective bargaining rights similar to those now ex-
tended to employees by the National Labor Relations Act,37 and
would give the governmental employer the express statutory au-
thority often thought to be needed for it to enter into a collective
bargaining contract. The bill was favorably reported out of the
Labor and Public Welfare Committee but it died on the general
file at the close of the session by virtue of a motion to postpone
indefinitely all bills remaining on the general file.38 In the words of
the chairman of the committee:
The purpose of the bill is to empower officials of Public Power
Districts, cities and political subdivisions to bargain collectively
with representatives of their employees and more especially where
such governmental subdivisions operate electric power and light
plants. This bill has no connection with strikes, closed shop or
exclusive bargaining rights. It was the opinion of the majority of
the committee that this bill only confirms the rights that the em-
ployees now have. That is also the opinion of the Attorney Gen-
eral. This bill is to clarify existing rights.3 9
35 Id.
36 L.B. 207 56th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1943).
87 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1964).
38 Files of Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 56th Neb. Leg. Sess.
(1943).
39 Id. (Statement of Senator George Craven, Committee Chairman.)
(Emphasis added).
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It is obvious from this statement that the majority of the
committee felt that the governmental employers in Nebraska did not
need express statutory authority to enter into collective bargain-
ing agreements with their employees. They apparently also be-
lieved that under the law, as it then existed, the employees had a
right to be represented in these collective bargaining sessions by
a representative of their own choosing. This is what the bill pur-
ported to do and the committee looked upon the bill as merely a
clarification of existing rights.
The attorney general of Nebraska concurred. In a reply to a
request from Senator Craven for an opinion on the bill, Mr. Walter
R. Johnson, Nebraska Attorney General said, "In our judgment the
bill [L.B. 207] as thus amended would be an expression of the law
as it now exists and would apply to controversies which may arise
between municipalities or public corporations and their employees
and would be in effect a legislative declaration of existing law. '40
In the 1947 session of the Nebraska Legislature a bill similar to
the 1943 bill and purporting to accomplish the same purpose was
introduced before the legislature.41 This bill was indefinitely post-
poned by the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare because "it
was not needed and would serve no useful purpose. '42 In light of
the report on the bill four years earlier, this statement could
easily be interpreted to mean that this committee also felt that
this bill too was but a declaration of the existing law and therefore
unnecessary. Since 1947 there has been no attempt in the Ne-
braska Legislature to give all governmental employers the express
statutory authority to bargain collectively with their employees. 43
The fact that the earlier bills failed because they were considered
a "legislative declaration of existing rights" must be considered as
having a deterring effect on any subsequent bills.
40 Nebraska Attorney General's Opinion, March 22, 1943, in C. RHYNE,
LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYE LAw 279 (1946) (Emphasis
added).
41 L.B. 468 60th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1947).
42 Files of Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 60th Neb. Leg. Sess.
(1947).
43 All the bills referred to by the court in the Hastings case were con-
cerned solely with disputes involving a public utility operated by the
government in its proprietary capacity. The 1967 legislature passed
LB 298 which was substantively the same as the previous unsuccessful
bills. LB 298 gives the Court of Industrial Relations the power to
order bargaining between the parties in the event of an industrial dis-
pute, a power which the Hastings case held that they did not have.
Since 1947, there have been no attempts in the Nebraska Legislature
to give all governmental employees comprehensive collective bargain-
ing rights similar to the two earlier bills.
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However, in 1965 the Nebsaska Supreme Court declared the
law in Nebraska to be exactly the opposite of what the legislators
and the attorney general thought the law was in 1943 and 1947.
In Local 507, IBEW v. Hastings4 the court said, "The generally
accepted rule established in other jurisdictions on the issue, which
we adopt, is that a public agency or governmental employer has
no legal authority to bargain with a labor union in the absence of
express statutory authority."45 The resulting conflict is that the
legislature, at least the legislature in 1943, apparently believed that
governmental employers had the power and authority to bargain
collectively with a representative chosen by their employees, while
the supreme court in 1965 believed that there was no such power or
authority unless the legislature expressly granted it.
The Hastings case does not specify what authority the govern-
mental employer in Nebraska has short of actually signing a collect-
ive bargaining contract, nor does it specify what rights the govern-
mental employee has in Nebraska. The court bases its statement
of the rule on a Florida Case, Dade County v. Amalgamated Ass'n
of Street Electric Ry. & M.C. Emp.,46 and an Alabama case, Local
321, Int'l Union of Operating Eng. v. Water Works Bd.47
In the Dade County case the county transit authority purchased
the local bus transportation system from its private owner. The
national union had been representing the bus drivers for a number
of years and a collective bargaining contract with the bus company
was in effect. The union requested the county to recognize the
union as exclusive bargaining agent, and assume the existing col-
lective bargaining agreement. The county brought the suit to deter-
mine their status in relation to the union. A Florida court of ap-
peals held: "Unless clearly authorized to do so by the enactment of
legislation, the plaintiffs [the county] would not be authorized and
are not now authorized to enter into collective bargaining agree-
ments, within the labor relations meaning of the term, with the
defendants [the union]."48 A Florida statute in force at the time of
the Dade County case prohibits a strict interpretation of this rule.
Under this statute49 all governmental employees in the state are
44 179 Neb. 455, 138 N.W.2d 822 (1965).
45 Id. at 457, 138 N.W.2d at 824.
46 157 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963).
47 276 Ala. 462, 163 So. 2d 619 (1964).
48 Dade County v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Electric Ty. & M.C. Emp.,
157 So. 2d 176, 181 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963).
49 FLA. STAT. § 839.221 (1965). "(2) All employees who comply with
the provisions of this section are assured the right and freedom of
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assured the right and freedom of association, self-organization and
the right to join any employee or labor organization. This is not
a comprehensive statute as discussed above but it clearly gives the
employees the right to join an outside organization and choose a
representative to present their proposals for them. Interpreted in
light of this statute (which the court cited) the Dade County
case holds only that the governmental agency does not have the
authority to enter into an actual collective bargaining contract with
its employees.
In the Water Works Board case an international union had
been representing the employees for some thirty years, during
which time a series of twelve collective bargaining contracts were
executed betwen the parties. The union sought a declaratory rul-
ing that the contract then in force was valid and enforceable. The
Alabama court held that "matters of wages, hours, and conditions of
employment never have been, and cannot become, a matter of col-
lective bargaining and contract in the absence of constitutional or
statutory authority .. .
In reaching this result the court quoted the rule from the
Dade County case and relied heavily on several attorney generals'
opinions in Alabama. The opinions were based on the proposition
that there was no specific authority granted to the governmental
employer to enter into such a contract and, therefore, they did not
have the authority to do so. This case, like Hastings, makes no
mention of the authority of the employer to negotiate with the
representative of the employees without actually signing a contract.
It is interesting to note that in this case the employees were or-
ganized; they were represented by an international union and the
water works board had been bargaining collectively with the union
for some 30 years. The court makes no mention of the propriety of
the employees being represented by an international union.
These cases indicate that under the "generally accepted rule"
the public employees are not denied a right to organize and to
associate with outside labor unions. A similar interpretation of
the Hastings rule is also warranted by the language of the court.
The court says, "Up to the present time, public employees are gen-
erally not entitled to collective bargaining in the sense that pri-
association, self-organization, and the right to join or to continue as
members of any employee or labor organization which complies with
this section, and shall have the right to present proposals relative to
salaries and other conditions of employment through representatives
of their own choosing."
50 Local 321, Int'l Union of Operating Eng. v. Water Works Bd., 276 Ala.
462, 465, 163 So. 2d 619, 622 (1964).
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vate industrial employees are."51 The collective bargaining rights
of private employees are protected by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act 52 and are broad and comprehensive. It is clear that gov-
ernmental employees are not included within this act5 3 and that
they do not have the same rights, but the question of what specific
rights governmental employees in Nebraska do have is still un-
answered.
Legislation recently passed in the 1967 session of the Nebraska
Legislature has extended the power of the Court of Industrial Rela-
tions to order bargaining between labor organizations representing
certain governmental employees and their employers when they are
involved in an industrial dispute. LB 298, a bill substantively the
same as the unsuccessful bills referred to in the Hastings case,
allows the Court of Industrial Relations to order bargaining between
the employers and employees of a public utility operated by the
government in its proprietary capacity. LB 875 gives them sub-
stantially the same authority when an industrial dispute arises be-
tween any labor organization or the employees of a paid fire de-
partment and a city having a population of more than 5,000 or which
is under a civil service system.
The 1967 legislature also passed LB 583 which appears to be a
codification of existing law. This act declares that a refusal to
discuss terms or conditions of employment shall constitute an in-
dustrial dispute and that no governmental subdivision can be com-
pelled to enter into a contract with any labor organization. Thus
certain governmental employees in Nebraska can now turn to the
Court of Industrial Relations when their employer refuses to bar-
gain in good faith and the court has the authority to order the
employer to bargain with the labor organization authorized by the
employees. This is precisely the kind of oider that was set aside
by the supreme court in the Hastings case.
Collective bargaining has long served private industry as an
instrumentality promoting industrial peace, as well as acquiring
benefits for the employees. The public employees have as a result
of being denied these rights been left behind and it has been said
that the "public employees patiently await the grant of first class
citizenship."5 4 However, it has recently become painfully obvious
51 Local 507, IBEW'v. Hastings, 179 Neb. 455, 457, 138 N.W.2d 822, 824
(1965) (Emphasis added).
52 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1964).
53 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1964).
.4. Weisenfeld, .Public Employees-First or Second Class Citizens, 16 Lab.
L.J. 685, 704 (1965).. ,,.. :. .
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that these employees do not always so "patiently await." Disastrous
strikes by vital public employees such as firemen and nurses have
frequently demonstrated this in the past year.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is well established that public employees do not share the
same collective bargaining rights as their counterparts in private
industry. The demands of the governmental employees to be rec-
ognized as a bargaining unit are, however, rapidly increasing. 55
Where these efforts are denied or completely ignored these em-
ployees have demonstrated that they will take action,56 generally
to the detriment of the public as a whole. Although public em-
ployees will likely never share the full rights of private industry
employees, they are entitled to a stronger voice in the deter-
mination of their wages, working conditions and presentation of
their grievances.
The problems presented by disgruntled public employees have
been met or anticipated in many states by legislation giving them
express authority to organize, associate with a labor union and
bargain collectively with their employers. This legislation clarifies
the rights of public employees and removes the uncertainty left
by court decisions such as the Hastings case. The 1967 legislature
has taken the first step in granting all public employees their "first
class citizenship" but it is not enough. Such piecemeal legislation
can only result in greater uncertainty and stronger demands by
those groups not included.
It is submitted that broad, comprehensive legislation giving all
governmental employees in Nebraska the right to organize, to join
outside labor organizations, to bargain collectively with their em-
55 For example the American Federation of State, Country and Municipal
Employes. As of May 1966, the union claimed 305,000 members, an
increase from 250,000 in May 1964. "Coming: Unionized Govern-
ment," 61 U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 26, 1966, 96, 97.
56 Jerry Wurf, President of the American Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employes said, "I remember a strike I was involved in
about a year and a half ago where the employer, at every meeting,
kept handing us a copy of a State statute telling us we had practically
no rights and, therefore, he wouldn't settle the grievance. Our people
went out on strike in sheer indignation at the fact that the employer
wouldn't responsibly deal with his conditions of employment." Id. at
97.
Other examples in 1966 alone include the firemen strikes in Kansas
City and Alanta where the National Guard had to be called out to
man the fire stations; the two nurses' "strikes" in San Francisco; and
numerous school teacher strikes across the country.
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ployers, and enter into collective bargaining agreements with them
would be desirable, beneficial and timely.
William E. Marsh '68
